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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Trusts: Express Trusts Where the Trustee Lacks Legal Title:
In Estate of Martin,' it appears from the court's statement of facts, al-
though the exact terms of the wili are not set forth, that the testator
had intended by his will to create a trust wherein the trustee was to have
legal title to the trust assets plus a power of sale over the realty. The
testator's wife was to receive the use and income from the trust assets
for life, the corpus to pass to the testator's children upon the wife's
death. The final decree of distribution in the probate proceedings, how-
ever, transferred the property not to the trustee but to the wife, giving
her the use and income thereof for life, the corpus to go to the testator's
children. The final decree also appointed the defendant as trustee for
the purpose of carrying out the terms of the will and gave him, as pro-
vided in the will, the power of sale over the real estate. The trustee
then took over the administration of all the assets and continued to
exercise broad powers over the assets until the wife's death, some ten
years later.
The defendant had apparently engaged in some questionable prac-
tices during his term as trustee, and his final account did not possess
the accuracy and clarity required of a trustee's account. However, the
defendant argued that he had been appointed by the final decree of the
probate court as a mere trustee for the convenience of administration,
no property having been assigned to him by the final decree. The de-
fendant urged that, as a mere trustee for convenience, he was not sub-
ject to as high a degree of care in accounting as were conventional
trustees of express trusts. The trial court accepted this argument in ap-
proving the final account, stating that the defendant "rendered as ac-
curate and detailed a report and account as available data made pos-
sible. ' 2 The remaindermen, the testator's children, appealed from the
order approving the trustee's account, urging that the defendant was
a trustee of an express trust and, as such, had breached his duty to
account.
In order to sustain the appellant's contention, which the court ul-
timately did, the supreme court had to establish that the defendant was
a trustee of an express trust. An express trust may be defined as "a
fiduciary relationship in which one person holds a property interest, sub-
ject to an equitable obligation to keep or use that interest for the benefit
of another." 3 For an express trust to come into existence, it is necessary
that the settlor manifest an intention to create a trust. Although the
trustee, the beneficiary, and the trust property are the elements which
make up a complete trust, either the trustee or the beneficiary, or both,
may be temporarily absent without preventing the trust's creation or
' Estate of Martin, 21 Wis. 2d 334, 124 N.W. 2d 297 (1963).
2Id. at 338, 124 N.W. 2d at 300.
3 Bo(GERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §1 (1951).
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its later destruction.4 A trust cannot exist, however, unless there is trust
property in existence. Once it is determined, therefore, that the settlor
has manifested his intention to create the trust and there is trust prop-
erty in existence to which the trust can relate, the trustee can be held
by the proper court to all the fiduciary duties which attach to that rela-
tionship. Among those duties is the duty to account. In describing the
degree of care to be exercised by a trustee in this matter, the court
stated:
However one may handle his personal affairs, a trustee has
the duty to keep proper accounts of his stewardship. The re-
sponsibilities and duties of a trustee are not to be lightly assumed
or carelessly executed. Good faith in their performance is not
sufficient. . . . The accounts should be clear and accurate and
if they are not, all presumptions are against the trustee and all
obscurities and doubts are to be taken adversely to him.5
As previously stated, in order to hold the defendant to this high
degree of care in accounting, the court had to establish that an express
trust had been created; that is, that there was trust property sufficient
to sustain a trust and that the testator manifested his intention to create
a trust. The court, however, was faced with the novel situation where
the trustee did not hold legal title to the trust res, but held only a power
of sale (due to the final decree which could no longer be attacked be-
cause of lapse of time). Yet the court found an express trust, stating,
"Trust property, however, need not consist of legal title to the subject
matter of the trust but some interest in property is necessary. Here, the
power of sale of real estate was given to the trustee and would be tech-
nically sufficient to sustain a trust."6 The court cited the Restatement
of Trusts:
The owner of land in creating a trust may expressly give to
the trustee a legal estate in the land and incident to it the powers
which the legal owner of such an estate normally has. [This is
usually the case.] In such a case, the estate is held in trust. The
owner may, however, give to the trustee merely powers without
creating an estate in him. In that case the powers are held in
trust. Whether the owner gives to the trustee an estate or merely
powers depends upon the manifestation of his intention.
7
4 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRuSTS § 2 (1959).
5 Estate of Martin, supra note 1, at 341-42, 124 N.W. 2d at 302.
61d. at 340, 124 N.W. 2d at 301.
7 RESTATEmENT, supra note 4, § 88, comment b. Scott, as reporter for the Re-
statement, quite naturally adheres to the Restatement view in his own treatise,
ScoTT, TRusTs § 88 (2d ed. 1956). The court also cited RESTATEMENT, supra
note 4, § 2, comment c: "The term 'property' denotes interests in things and
not the things themselves .... The term 'trust property' denotes the interests
which are held in trust. The term 'the subject matter of the trust! denotes the
things themselves interests in which are held in trust. Thus, where the owner
of land transfers an estate in fee simple or for life or for a term of years
to a person as trustee, the estate is the trust property, and the land itself is
the subject matter of the trust." The court apparently used this to clarify
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The court went on to say: "We consider the defendant a trustee of a
trust.., created by the will [indicating the court's belief that the testator
intended to create a trust] and because of the circumstances the de-
fendant had fiduciary duties respecting the property to which he did
not have legal title."" (Emphasis added.)
The New York courts have upheld this concept of a trustee holding
a mere "naked" or collateral power in trust, legal title being in the bene-
ficiary. A will was construed in a proceeding to settle a trustee's account
in the case of In Re Martin's Will.9 The testator had created by his will
a residuary trust for the primary benefit of his widow, and upon her
death directed that the principal of the trust go to his grandchildren.
The will provided further that if the widow died before any of the
grandchildren reached majority, the trustee was to manage their dis-
tributive shares until they reached majority. The trust terminated on
the widow's death and the remainder vested equally in the grandchil-
dren, two of whom were minors. The court held that the trustee be-
came donee of a power in trust over the minors' funds and that the trus-
tee had the power and duty to pay income and invade principal when-
ever necessary for the support, maintenance, and education of the
minors subject, of course, to the control of the court. The case of In Re
Babbage's Estate" was also concerned with a will construction. The
testator had bequeathed a substantial part of his estate to a minor and
directed that the minor's father manage the minor's property for her
welfare. The father contended that he was a mere custodian who, in
administering the fund, was not answerable to the court for his actions.
However, the court held that the father was given powers in trust over
the minor's property, which intention the testator had manifested by
imposing equitable duties on the father to deal with the property for
the benefit of the minor. The court held further that it had jurisdiction
over the father in his exercise of the power.
The New York cases dealt with the situation where the testator
ivtended to give the trustee merely a power in trust. Although the
principal case dealt with a situation where the testator intended the
trustee to have legal title as well as a power of sale, the same question-
whether a mere power can be held in trust-arose due to the final decree
in the probate proceedings. This decree did not provide the trustee with
legal title, but it did leave with him the power of sale which the testator
had intended the trustee to have in order to facilitate the administration
of the trust. The final decree left only a power of sale to sustain the trust.
The aforementioned cases are to be distinguished from those in which
the distinction, in its use of the terms, between the trust property and the
subject matter of the trust.
8 Estate of Martin, supra note 1, at 341, 124 N.W. 2d at 301.
9221 N.Y.S. 2d 667, 32 Misc. 2d 555 (1961).
10 106 N.Y.S. 2d 332, 201 Misc. 750 (1951).
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a power has been found to be held in trust due to the application of
statutes limiting the purposes for which express trusts can be created.
For example, in Janura v. Fencl,11 the trust instrument recited that the
trustee was to have no duties to perform for twenty years, and the bene-
ficiaries were to have the management and control of the property during
that time. If any property remained in the trust at the expiration of
twenty years, the trustee was then to sell it and divide the proceeds
among the beneficiaries. The court found this to be a passive trust, with
legal title vesting in the beneficiaries. It also held that the power of sale
granted to the trustee was valid as a power in trust 2 and that the trustee
could exercise that power in twenty years if, in the meantime, the bene-
ficiaries had not disposed of the property themselves.
The technical objections to a power being held in trust seem to be
that the trustee does not hold legal title to the trust res and that it is
questionable whether a power can be said to be property or an interest
in property sufficient to sustain a trust. As evidenced by its holding in
the Martin case, the court feels that (at least in this limited situation)
a trust can exist without legal title in the trustee and that a power, if
not "property" for all purposes, is at least an interest in property suf-
ficient to sustain a trust. A leading authority in the trust field reasons
as follows:
In the case of both trust and trust powers one holds a property
interest which he is under a duty to use for another's benefit.
If the trust power relation is fiduciary and the donee's duty is
enforceable in equity, there is no reason why the trust power
should not be called a true trust.. . . A power to dispose of prop-
erty the general ownership of which is vested in another is cer-
tainly a property interest. If a donor sought by express language
to create an imperative power and make it the subject matter
of a true trust, it would seem that he should succeed."
Although the argument was not presented in the Martin case, this writer
feels that our Wisconsin statutes recognizing powers in trust1 4 could be
urged upon the court in any future case involving a similar issue. It is
to be noted, however, that.if the settlor intends to create a trust with
only powers as the trust property and any of the powers are manda-
tory, he should manifest such intent clearly, for the Restatement warns:
"1261 Wis. 179, 52 N.W. 2d 144 (1952).
12 Wis. STAT. § 231.14 (1961) : "When an express trust shall be created for any
purpose not enumerated in the preceding sections of this chapter no estate
shall vest in the trustees; but the trust, if directing or authorizing the per-
formance of any act which may be lawfully performed under a power, shall
be valid as a power in trust. .. " The comparable New York statute is N.Y.
REAL PROP. LAW § 99.
13 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 3, § 116. Contrary to the Restatement, Bogert uses
the terms "trust property," "trust res," and "subject matter of the trust"
interchangibly. Id. § 111.
14 WIs. STAT. § 231.14 (1961), supra note 12. See also Wis. STAT. % 232.21, .22(1961), defining general and special powers in trust.
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If by the terms of the instrument creating a trust manda-
tory powers are conferred upon the trustee, although by the in-
strument no legal estate is limited to him in specific words, he
takes an estate and not merely powers, in the absence of a con-
trary intention.15
One would normally think that the exercise of a mere power of sale
in trust should not require the effort and expertise in accounting re-
quired of the defendant in the Martin case. Indeed, all that one who
exercises a power of sale should have to do, it seems, is account for the
proceeds and show that he received a reasonable price. Nevertheless,
the trustee in the Martin case undertook the broad administration of all
the property. He supervised some of the assets and completely con-
trolled the others. Although the reported case does not specifically list
any other powers exercised by the trustee, it can be safely assumed that
he did so (investing corpus and income, incurring expenses in preserv-
ing the estate, etc.). Such activities only served to increase his responsi-
bilities to account, even though by exercising these other powers, he
exceeded his authority as trustee. Because the trustee undertook to
exercise these added powers and to determine, by himself, his own duties
for ten years, the court in effect estopped him from denying that he had
these added powers for the exercise of which he had to account. The
court said: "If there were any question of the scope of his duties, the
trustee should not have waited ten years before claiming his rights were
less than those which, in fact, he exercised."'"
DONALD J. BAUHS
Insurance: Construction of the Uninsured Motorist Clause: In
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brower,' a Virginia case, plaintiff
sued his own insurance carrier. Brower, the insured, was injured when
his automobile was struck by an automobile driven by one Mazza.
Brower sued Mazza for damages and recovered a judgment. Because
Mazza's insurance carrier, National Automobile Insurance Co., had
gone into receivership four months before the action was instituted, it
did not appear in the action, offered no defense, and paid no part of
the judgment.
Plaintiff based his action against his own carrier on the Virginia
uninsured motorist statute. This statute provides that, in all bodily
injury and property damage insurance policies, the insurer shall un-
dertake to pay the insured the amount he is entitled to recover as
damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle.'
The statutes define an uninsured motor vehicle as
15 RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 88, comment c.16 Estate of Martin, supra note 1, at 341, 124 N.W. 2d at 301.
1 134 S.E. 2d 277 (Va. 1934).
2 VA. CODE § 38.1-381(b) (1950).
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